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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate concentration in the United States has been on the rise in recent years, sparking a heated 
debate about its causes, consequences, and potential remedies. In this study, we examine a facet of 
public policy that has been largely neglected in current debates about concentration: corporate tax 
policy. As part of our analysis we develop the first empirical mapping of the effective tax rates (ETRs) 
of nonfinancial corporations disaggregated by size and broken down by jurisdiction. Our findings 
reveal a striking and persistent tax advantage for big business in recent decades. Since the mid-1980s, 
large corporations have faced lower worldwide ETRs relative to their smaller counterparts. The 
regressive worldwide ETR is driven by persistent regressivity in the domestic ETR and a marked drop 
in the progressivity of the foreign ETR over the past decade. We go on to show how persistent 
regressivity in the worldwide tax structure is bound up with the increasing relative power of large 
corporations within the corporate universe, as well as a shift in firm-level power relations. As large 
corporations become less disposed to investments that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers, they 
become more disposed to shareholder value enhancement that directly benefits the asset-rich. What 
this means is that the corporate tax structure is connected not only to rising corporate concentration, 
but also to widening household inequality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few decades the largest corporations in the United States have been taking greater shares 
of net income, revenues, assets, and market capitalization.1 The studies that have unearthed increasing 
concentration have also shown that big business charges higher prices while at the same time lowering 
wages, providing lower quality goods and services, and restricting output.2 In the aggregate, corporate 
concentration has been blamed for the slowdown in productivity growth and a sluggish economy.3 A 
recent paper by Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon even argues that the US, once the 
posterchild of economic dynamism, has lost its competitive edge relative to Europe because of its 
failures to combat concentration.4 In addition to stifling competition, concentration has also been 
linked to rising inequality and the increasing political clout of big business.5 With a growing number 
of people feeling the system is rigged in favour of elites, the concentration of wealth and power in the 
hands of a few giant corporations adds more fuel to the already-seething flames of populist 
discontent.6  
 
How did we get into a situation where a few “superstar” companies dominate? Market processes of 
globalization and technological change are identified as two of the main drivers.7 The former allows 
multinationals to expand the scope of their operations and to lower costs, while the latter entails 
network effects that may encourage “winner-take-all” dynamics.8 Digital platforms tend toward 
monopoly. A social media user derives no clear benefit from having their contacts spread across 
various sites, the whole point is to connect everyone together in one location. Yet in the US growing 
concentration has been pervasive within domestically-oriented, brick and mortar sectors as well as 
globalized, high technology ones.9 The ubiquity of oligopolistic giants throughout the US corporate 
landscape suggests that something more than just market processes is at play. That something is 
politics, and in particular, public policy. As large corporations command ever-greater shares of 
resources, regulatory bodies like the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have 
come under fire for enabling concentration through lax antitrust policies and lenient merger 
enforcement.10  
 
Not that long ago it was common for mainstream economists and policymakers to follow the Chicago 
School and downplay the consequences of corporate concentration. Growing size, they argued, is 
simply a reflection of the growing efficiencies of large corporations relative to their smaller 
 2 
competitors.11 Due in large part to their abilities to exploit economies of scale, corporate behemoths 
are credited with boosting competition and improving consumer welfare.12 But now this view has 
come under fire, even within the Chicago School itself. In 2017 and 2018 the University of Chicago’s 
Booth School of Business held two events on the threats posed by corporate concentration. As The 
Economist magazine quipped: “[u]ntil recently, convening a conference supporting antitrust concerns 
in the Windy City was like holding a symposium on sobriety in New Orleans.”13 
 
The political aspects of corporate concentration have not been lost on politicians. Still reeling from 
the presidential election defeat in 2016, the Democratic Party announced “A Better Deal” strategy for 
the 2018 midterms. A throwback to New Deal progressivism, Democrats vowed to tackle oligopolistic 
market structures through antitrust reforms that would empower regulators to break up monopolies 
and make it harder for companies to merge if it is deemed to reduce competition.14 Even Donald 
Trump has been unable to resist the trust-busting fervor.15 During his presidential campaign he 
lambasted Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal in 2011 and vowed to stop a potential merger 
between AT&T and Time Warner. It is tempting to dismiss Trump’s rhetoric as a narrow side-swipe 
against the “liberal media.” But the fact that a Republican president (and self-styled business tycoon) 
would entertain these trust-busting taboos shows just how politically charged the issue has become. 
 
From its origins in the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, antitrust policy has been 
the main weapon of the US federal government in combatting the power of giant corporations. And 
given that concentration has increased alongside the rolling back of robust antitrust measures in recent 
decades, it makes sense for current debates to draw linkages between the two. Yet as important as 
antitrust may be, it is not the only facet of public policy that bears upon the distribution of corporate 
wealth, income, and power. In this paper, we examine another facet of public policy almost entirely 
absent from recent discussions of concentration: corporate taxation.  
 
To be sure, the tax practices of large corporations have been subject to plenty of scrutiny. Exposés in 
major newspapers reveal how some business giants reap record profits while paying nothing to the 
US Treasury.16 It has been acknowledged that globalization may confer a tax advantage on dominant 
firms, which are better equipped than their smaller counterparts to evade and avoid taxes by shifting 
their profits to low tax jurisdictions.17 There is also some recognition of how large corporations draw 
on inordinate legal resources in order to lobby for favorable tax policies and to exploit loopholes in 
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the US’s byzantine tax code.18 The 2019 World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) mentions progressive corporate tax reform as a way to redress the rising “market power” of 
large corporations.19 Massachusetts senator and presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to 
impose a 7 percent levy on corporations with annual profits in excess of $100 million has finally 
brought tax issues into the political debates about corporate concentration.20 What is lacking, however, 
is a systematic examination of the linkages between corporate concentration and taxation. We find 
this neglect of taxation within the current discussions of corporate concentration puzzling, especially 
since it has long been recognized that income tax has a direct effect on distributive outcomes.21  
 
In investigating the relationship between corporate taxes and concentration, we address several key 
questions. Do large US corporations face higher income tax burdens than smaller corporations? How 
have the tax rates of US corporations of different sizes evolved over time? Do large US corporations 
enjoy a global tax advantage compared to their smaller counterparts? What role does the domestic tax 
system – both federal and state – play in shaping the distribution of income within the corporate 
universe? What does an inquiry into the relationship between corporate concentration and taxation 
reveal about the wider transformations of US capitalism over the past few decades?   
 
To explore these questions, our research maps the effective income tax rates (ETRs) within the 
nonfinancial sector, using the top 10 percent as our proxy for large corporations, and the bottom 90 
percent as our proxy for smaller corporations.22 As far as we are aware, this is the first study to develop 
estimates of what we term “jurisdictional tax rates” for US corporations disaggregated by size. Our 
findings point toward a striking and persistent tax advantage for big business in recent decades. We 
find that in the 1970s the worldwide ETR of the top 10 percent was consistently higher than that of 
the bottom 90 percent. By the early 1980s, the ETR of large and smaller corporations had equalized 
at 29 percent. But from the mid-1980s onward, large corporations consistently face lower worldwide 
ETRs relative to their smaller counterparts. In recent years, the gap is particularly pronounced, with 
the top 10 percent registering a worldwide ETR of 28 percent, and the bottom 90 percent a worldwide 
ETR of 41 percent. We then break down the worldwide rate into its domestic and foreign components. 
From the mid-1980s, the earliest period for which jurisdictional data are available, up to the present, 
we find that the domestic ETR of the top 10 percent is consistently 11 to 16 percentage points lower 
than that of the bottom 90 percent. The foreign ETRs of both the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 
percent have steadily declined since the 1980s. From the mid-1980s to the 2000s, the foreign ETR of 
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the top 10 percent was 1 to 7 percentage points higher than that of the bottom 90 percent. But since 
2010 the situation has reversed, with large corporations now facing a foreign ETR that is 4 percentage 
points lower than that of their smaller counterparts. Overall, these shifts suggest that the regressive 
worldwide ETR is due to persistently regressive domestic ETRs and a marked drop in the progressivity 
of foreign ETRs in recent years. 
 
We then go on to explore some of the implications of the findings that emerge from our mapping of 
jurisdictional ETRs. Building on the “capital as power” approach, we demonstrate how a sustained 
reduction in the relative tax burden of large corporations since the mid-1980s coincides with a 
sustained increase in the concentration of power as measured by relative net profit margins.23 We also 
show that a reduction in the relative tax burden of large corporations since the mid-1980s has also 
coincided with a reconfiguration of power relations within and beyond the firm. As large corporations 
become less disposed to investments that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers, they become more 
disposed to shareholder value enhancement that directly benefits the asset-rich. What this means is 
that the corporate tax structure is bound up not only with rising corporate concentration, but also 
widening household inequality. 
 
The remainder of our paper is organized into six sections. In the first section, we provide some of the 
historical context for our subsequent analysis, exploring how changes in patterns of corporate taxation 
relate to broader shifts in the public finances of advanced capitalist countries. In the second section, 
we review the substantial body of literature that has emerged over the past half century on the 
relationship between corporate size and ETRs. Alongside this review, we develop a capital as power 
alternative to the theories employed in the existing literature, which analyse the nexus of size and 
ETRs in terms of political costs or political power. In the third section we outline our data and 
methods, and in the fourth section we present our empirical mapping of jurisdictional ETRs. We then 
shift focus in the fifth section with a discussion of recent debates about the consequences of corporate 
tax reform. These debates provide a foundation for thinking about the implications of our findings, a 
task we undertake in section six. In systematically linking our map of jurisdictional tax rates to the 
changes of profit margins, capital expenditures, as well as dividend payments and stock buybacks, our 
aim in the sixth section is to empirically substantiate the theoretical claims set forth in section two. 
Finally, we conclude by summarizing our main findings and underlining why we think that issues of 
taxation deserve much more attention within debates about corporate concentration.  
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FROM TAX STATE TO DEBT STATE 
 
Our analysis begins by providing some historical context. Specifically, we draw on some of the recent 
work of Wolfgang Streeck, which provides what we consider to be a useful, if stylized, account of 
profound transformations that have taken place in the public finances over the past half century.24 In 
the post-World War II period, Streeck argues that advanced capitalist countries were “tax states,” 
characterized by gradually increasing government expenditures, increasing government revenues 
garnered through progressive taxation, and low levels of public indebtedness. But around 1980, the 
tax state gave way to a “debt state,” under which gradually increasing government expenditures have 
combined with stagnating government revenues, declining tax progressivity, and increasing levels of 
public indebtedness.25  
 
How did this shift in the public finances occur? According to Streeck, gradually increasing government 
spending is a functional corollary of capitalist development and the expansion of markets. There is, in 
Streeck’s own words, “a growing need for public investment and curative measures” to repair “the 
damage caused by capital accumulation, as well as creating the conditions for further growth”.26 Yet 
stagnating tax receipts are more overtly political in the sense that they are a product of organized tax 
resistance from the top end of the income distribution.27 In the 1990s, the pressure on tax receipts 
from the organized resistance of higher-income households was intensified by globalization, which 
made it easier for large corporations to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. Increased capital mobility 
impelled governments to engage in fiscal competition by lowering their top statutory corporate tax 
rates.28 In this way, stagnating tax receipts are bound up with the declining progressivity of the tax 
structure, as wealthy households and large corporations pay less in tax as a percentage of their total 
income.29  
 
The logical sequence of the debt state is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we see that the trio of gradually 
increasing government spending, stagnating tax receipts, and declining tax progressivity leads to 
increasing inequality and increased savings for wealthy households and large corporations, on the one 
hand, and increasing public debt, on the other hand. Completing the loop, the increased savings of 
wealthy households and large corporations are funnelled into a growing supply of government 
bonds. Ultimately what this means is that the public finances have partly shifted from imposing tax 
liabilities on large corporations and wealthy households to issuing financial assets (i.e. government 
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bonds) to them. The distributional implications of this dynamic are clear as the debt state fuels asset 
concentration in the household and corporate sectors.30 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Empirical support for some of the main facets of Streeck’s account of the transformations in public 
finances can be found in Figure 2. The graph in the top left-hand corner of the figure shows 
government expenditures and tax receipts as percentages of GDP for the US and the G7 as a whole. 
As we see, the gap between expenditures and tax receipts widens considerably from the 1970s 
onwards, as the former gradually increases and the latter stagnates. In the graph in the top right-hand 
corner of Figure 2, we see how the widening gap between government expenditures and receipts has 
translated into ever-increasing levels of public indebtedness as a percentage of GDP. Most relevant 
for the purposes of our analysis are the changes to the corporate tax structure shown in the bottom 
two graphs of the figure. In bottom left-hand graph, we find evidence to suggest that stagnating tax 
revenues are being driven in large part by the dramatic fall in corporate income tax receipts. The 
decline in US corporate income tax receipts as a percentage of total tax revenue begins already after 
World War II but experiences a major collapse from the late-1970s to the early 1980s. If we follow 
Streeck’s rough periodization, corporate tax receipts made up an average of 22 percent of annual 
government tax revenues under the tax state (1946-79), and only 10 percent under the debt state (1980-
2017). Finally, in the bottom right-hand graph, we see, unsurprisingly perhaps, that the era of low 
corporate tax receipts was also an era of declining statutory corporate income tax rates. From the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s the US statutory rate is lower than the G7 average. Then from the late-1990s 
to 2017 the G7 average rate is lower than the US. With the passing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act at 
the end of 2017, the US statutory rate dips below that of the G7 average. What we see here is evidence 
of a downward spiral of fiscal competition in corporate tax policy alluded to in Streeck’s work.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The decline in corporate tax receipts and statutory corporate tax rates has contributed significantly to 
the stagnation of tax revenues over the past few decades. This suggests that a large part of the shift 
from the tax state to the debt state can be attributed to transformations in the structure of corporate 
taxation. For our purposes, the main questions we are left with concern the relationship of these 
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transformations in the corporate tax structure to tax progressivity. How has the distribution of tax 
liabilities changed within the US corporate sector since the rise of the debt state? Are large 
corporations the main winners of the long-term decline in corporate tax receipts and statutory tax 
rates? Do these changes in the corporate tax structure fuel concentration and inequality? As we will 
see in the next section, the existing literature is severely limited in helping us to address these 
questions.  
 
THE STATE OF THE ART: POLITICAL COSTS, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE 
DEGREE OF MONOPOLY 
 
In the introduction we noted how recent discussions of corporate concentration in the US tend to 
ignore issues of taxation. This neglect is puzzling not only because tax is one area of public policy that 
has a direct effect on distributive outcomes, but also because a significant body of research 
investigating the relationship between corporate size and ETRs has emerged over the past half 
century.31 In diverse fields, ranging from accounting, economics, and finance, to law and political 
science, researchers have been developing statistical models to explore whether the tax structure is 
biased in favour of large corporations. Why, then, have the findings of these studies been absent from 
recent discussions of corporate concentration? Part of the reason may have to do with the fact that 
the research efforts have produced nothing in the way of consensus on the relationship between 
corporate size and ETRs.32 
 
Existing studies are usually based on a linear regression model, either univariate or multivariate. 
Corporate size is specified as the independent variable, while the ETR is the dependent variable. In 
theoretical terms, the literature conceptualizes the size-ETR relation in terms of political costs or 
political power. According to political cost theory, large corporations are subject to greater public 
scrutiny, making them more susceptible to government meddling in the form of regulation and 
taxation. 33 Political cost theory predicts a positive relationship between size and ETR, resulting in a 
progressive corporate tax structure. According to political power theory, the inordinate resources of 
large corporations enable them to shape government regulations and policies in their favour.34 As 
such, the key prediction of political power theory is the obverse of the one made by political cost 
theory: there should be a negative relationship between size and ETR, resulting in a regressive 
corporate tax structure  
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The two theories provide us with straightforward predictions on the causal connection between 
corporate size and the ETR. And yet despite their simplicity, the studies operationalizing these theories 
have not come close to any consensus. A review of 56 existing studies on the size-ETR relation 
uncovers wildly varying results: 20 of the studies they review provide evidence for the political cost 
theory, 11 for the political power theory, 14 no clear evidence for either theory, and 11 evidence for 
both theories.35 Why are there such diverging assessments? One problem lies in research design. The 
findings of the regression analyses appear to be extremely sensitive to the specifications of each 
model.36 Slight variations in assumptions about parameters, in the definition of variables (e.g. firm size, 
ETR), in the scope of the sample, and in the time-period analyzed, lead to conflicting results. This 
makes it difficult to use the body of empirical evidence that has been amassed thus far to come to any 
firm conclusions regarding the size-ETR relation.  
 
Our own research departs from existing studies in three important ways. First, we explore the 
diachronic relationship between concentration and ETRs. The results of existing studies are reported 
in static regression tables and give us no indication of how the size-ETR relationship unfolds over 
time.37 For our purposes, this static approach is of limited use. We are interested, where possible, in 
mapping the long-term transformation of the corporate tax structure in order to assess its degree of 
progressivity from the tax state to the debt state.    
 
The second departure is theoretical. In existing studies, if the sign in the regression analysis is 
positive/negative and significant then this is taken as satisfactory evidence for the claim that political 
costs/political power explain or cause the progressive/regressive tax structure. Rarely are efforts made 
to specify, let alone explore empirically, the causal mechanism by which size as cost/power translates 
into higher/lower ETRs. A higher/lower ETR is simply taken as evidence of the greater political 
costs/political power of large firms. How do we know that large firms have greater political 
costs/political power? Because they face a higher/lower ETR. Rather than demonstrating the causal 
connection between costs/power and the ETR, both theories descend into intractable circularity. 
 
One potential way around this circularity would be to develop a proxy for costs/power independent 
of size. Yet as far as we are aware, no one has attempted to quantify political costs independent of size 
and we know of only one study that has developed an independent proxy for political power by 
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equating it with lobbying. Examining firm-level data on corporate lobbying expenses matched with 
firm-level data on ETRs, Richter et al. find that firms spending more on lobbying face a lower 
worldwide ETR in the following year.38 The size variable in their preferred model specification was, 
however, insignificant, leading them to speculate that the benefits of lobbying for large corporations 
may be offset by the political costs they incur from higher public scrutiny. In our view, the findings 
of the Richter et al. study are not all that surprising given that they rely on an overly circumscribed 
definition of power. As the literature on business power suggests, lobbying is but one facet of 
“instrumental power,” understood as direct and purposeful influence over government.39 
Furthermore, alongside instrumental power there is a second form of power that is “structural.” The 
notion of structural power refers to an inherent bias in capitalist economies, one that favours private 
businesses as the main controllers of investment.40 The ever-looming threat of an “investment strike” 
disciplines governments into adopting policies that work in the interests of private business without 
private business needing to actively enforce that discipline.41  
 
How, then, do we move beyond the limitations of existing theories? We argue that the “capital as 
power” approach propounded by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler offers a promising 
alternative for analyzing the size-ETR relationship.42 Taking cues from the work of Michał Kalecki, 
Nitzan and Bichler identify the “degree of monopoly” (i.e. net profit margins), as a quantitative proxy 
for the concentration of power within the corporate universe.43 In this approach, power is inherently 
relative or differential. Put simply, the relative power of large corporations is registered in the degree 
to which they can raise their net profit to sales ratio over and above that of other corporations. Our 
own adaptation of the approach can be summarized with the following proposition: The higher the 
relative degree of monopoly enjoyed by large corporations, the greater the implied relative power of 
large corporations, and the lower the relative ETR of large corporations. Note that, in contrast to 
political power theory, we make no hard claims about the line of causality running from power to the 
ETR. Even if the degree of monopoly is a reasonable proxy for the concentration of power, we argue 
that it is difficult, perhaps even futile, to try to disentangle its relationship with ETRs in terms of cause 
and effect. After all, power may enable large corporations to lower their relative tax burden, and at the 
same time, a lower relative tax burden may augment the power of large corporations. Therefore, in 
our view, it is more fruitful to conceptualize the relationship between power and ETRs as co-
constitutive.  
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It might not be entirely evident how our alternative framework overcomes the charge of circularity 
that we have levelled at existing theories. To clarify, circularity is a problem for existing theories only 
insofar as they posit a clear causal relationship between the two variables (i.e. in the case of political 
power theory, from size as power to ETRs). In abandoning this rigid causal schema, we argue that the 
issue is not circularity per se, but whether our framework reveals something new about the wider 
consequences of the size-ETR relationship. Existing theories, whether cast in terms of political costs 
or political power, say little about consequences beyond the simple claim that the ETR is an effect of 
corporate size. We draw on the capital as power approach because it endeavors to illuminate the 
workings of “dominant capital,” the corporate giants at the center of accumulation.44 Drawing on 
Thorstein Veblen’s concept of “business sabotage,” Nitzan and Bichler contend that these firms are 
more disposed and better able than smaller companies to impose limits on productivity and innovation 
to maintain profit levels, to the detriment of society at large.45 Developing this mode of analysis, we 
examine how changes in the relative ETR are intertwined with the relative power of the top decile of 
corporations, and how it in turn impacts power relations within the firm.   
 
The expansive literature on financialization seems to be instructive insofar as it highlights how the 
shifts in corporate strategy towards shareholder value have contributed to growing household 
inequality through raising shareholder payouts while reducing investment in operations that may 
generate gainful job opportunities.46 Until very recently, this literature has had little to say about the 
relative susceptibility of large firms versus small firms to this shareholder value model.47 By 
disaggregating not only ETRs, but also firm-level investment and shareholder payouts, we illuminate 
how changes in the architecture of taxation and corporate governance affect distributional shifts 
across households. To the extent that large corporations augment their relative power within the 
corporate universe, they also increase their relative capacities to alter power relations within the firm 
by diverting resources from workers to shareholders and managers. This is the case because an increase 
in the oligopolistic power of large corporations means that they feel less pressure to plough their tax 
savings back into the expansion of productive capacity. To explore firm-level power relations, we use 
capital expenditure data to gage the relative commitment of large firms to advance productivity, 
innovation and job-creation through long-term investment, and we use dividends and share 
repurchase data to determine the degree to which this commitment is subordinated to the drive to 
increase short-term shareholder returns that directly and disproportionately benefit the asset-rich. 
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The third and final way that our research departs from existing studies of the size-ETR relation is in 
examining jurisdictional ETRs. The common strategy is to regress size variables against the worldwide 
ETR, giving us no indication of the role that domestic and foreign tax structures play in shaping the 
ETRs of corporations disaggregated by size. On the flipside, the scant literature on jurisdictional ETRs 
focuses almost exclusively on large corporations.48 This narrow emphasis on large corporations does 
not give us any sense of where they stand relative to small and medium-sized ones. In other words, 
these studies tell us nothing about the relationship between jurisdictional ETRs and corporate 
concentration. As far as we are aware, ours is the first study to systematically analyse jurisdictional 
ETRs disaggregated by size. Examining jurisdictional ETRs is especially important in the context of 
globalization. It is often implied in the literature that the type of corporation that enjoys a foreign tax 
advantage is a multinational one, specifically a large multinational one. 49 Mapping jurisdictional ETRs 
by size will allow us to assess whether large corporations do in fact enjoy a foreign tax advantage and 
how this advantage has changed over time.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Our study utilises the Compustat database of corporate financial statements. In the Compustat 
database, current income taxes can be broken down into three categories: federal income taxes, state 
income taxes, and foreign income taxes.50 Compustat also offers data on pretax income, which can be 
further broken down into pretax domestic income and pretax foreign income. These items allow us 
to create four jurisdictional measures: the worldwide ETR (federal, state, and foreign income taxes as 
a percentage of pretax domestic and pretax foreign income), the foreign ETR (foreign income taxes 
as a percentage of pretax foreign income), the federal ETR (federal income taxes as a percentage of 
pretax domestic income), and the state ETR (state income taxes as a percentage of pretax domestic 
income).  
 
Though Compustat is one of the best sources for detailed historical, firm-level data on ETRs, it has 
drawbacks. Compustat has data extending back to 1950, but specific data on current tax worldwide 
ETRs only go back to 1970. Coverage for jurisdictional ETRs (federal, state, and foreign) is even more 
limited, stretching back to 1984. The data allows us to examine worldwide ETRs for the entirety of 
the debt state, but only for the tail-end of the tax state. For jurisdictional ETRs we can only assess 
their transformations under the debt state. Compustat includes data on listed firms. According to the 
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World Federation of Exchanges data available from the World Bank, on an annual basis the average 
number of domestic (i.e. US-headquartered) listed companies from 1980 to 2018 is 5,796.51 This means 
that for the worldwide ETR our coverage is fairly comprehensive, with a yearly average of 5,020 
nonfinancial US corporations reporting the relevant data from 1980-2018. For jurisdictional ETRs, 
however, the size of our sample decreases significantly, with a yearly average of 1,393 nonfinancial US 
corporations reporting these data items from 1984-2018.  
 
The focus on listed companies has important implications for the study of concentration. Going public 
is usually associated with big business, and so our sample does not encompass the thousands of much 
smaller companies, including so-called “mom and pop” businesses, that may have incorporated but 
have not listed on the stock market. The exclusion of these unlisted firms from our sample means that 
we cannot assess the extent of concentration for the US corporate universe as a whole. Yet for a 
number of reasons we nevertheless think that Compustat is useful in exploring issues related to 
corporate concentration. First, despite the limited sample, there is still a wide variation in the size of 
listed corporations in our analysis. For example, the 2018 sample for the bottom 90 percent includes 
big players such as Keurig Dr Pepper, with assets of $49 billion, all the way down to lesser known 
entities like Plastic2Oil, with assets of $796,000. Thus, it should be stressed that our analysis is not just 
a comparison of giant and very large. Second, the significance of concentration partly relates to its 
bearing on competition. Large corporations are more likely to regard medium-sized listed companies 
as a threat to their competitive position than the thousands of small unlisted companies. Part of the 
rationale for medium-sized companies to go public in the first place is to raise finances in a bid to 
move into the upper echelons of dominant capital. The gap between large and smaller listed 
companies arguably tells us more about competitive dynamics than the gap between large firms and 
the corporate universe as a whole. Finally, the fact that we focus solely on listed companies means 
that our findings are probably conservative. Whether we find evidence of a progressive or regressive 
corporate tax structure, the magnitudes would likely be amplified with a larger sample of smaller 
companies.  
 
The first step in our empirical analysis was to gather together all of the US nonfinancial corporations 
that report the relevant data on ETRs and rank them annually from largest to smallest based on their 
total revenues. Next, we determined a cut-off point that would allow us to compare the ETRs of large 
and smaller corporations. In the literature on corporate concentration, there are two main options for 
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determining this cut-off point. We can follow the standard aggregate measure of concentration and 
focus on a fixed number of corporations (e.g. top 50 or top 100), or we can focus on a fixed proportion 
of corporations (e.g. top 1 percent or top 10 percent).52 One problem with the standard aggregate 
measure of concentration has to do with the fact that the numerator (top corporations) is fixed, while 
the denominator (total corporations) is constantly changing. As a result, a change in the ETR of 
smaller corporations might be due to a change in the total number of corporations in the denominator 
rather than a meaningful change in the rate at which they are taxed. Given the ambiguities associated 
with the standard aggregate method, we follow the latter method and use the top decile as our proxy 
for dominant capital. 
 
In our sample we include both profitable and unprofitable corporations. In this way, our selection 
method differs from the standard procedure, which is to exclude loss-making companies.53 Our 
decision to include both profitable and unprofitable corporations is informed by our specific interest 
in how corporate taxation relates to concentration. In his landmark study Competition in a Dual Economy, 
Joseph Bowring notes that the decision on whether to include unprofitable corporations can 
dramatically alter the outcomes of an empirical investigation.54 We follow Bowring in arguing that 
unprofitable corporations should be included in the sample precisely because these data give us 
important information about the competitive position of large versus small firms. Excluding 
unprofitable corporations can lead to overly-optimistic (and ultimately misleading) assessments of the 
competitive position of small corporations precisely because small loss-making corporations tend to 
report negative profits more often than large ones.  
 
One final methodological aspect of our study worth noting concerns the calculation of the ETR. 
Anyone who has worked with firm-level tax data knows the frustrations involved in developing 
historical measures. For individual companies, the ETR can swing wildly from year-to-year, and during 
major crises, many companies report negative pretax income, which makes the tax rate impossible to 
interpret (on the surface of things, a negative tax rate may seem like a good thing for a company, but 
not if it is the product of a negative denominator and a positive numerator). A way around these 
problems is to follow a technique developed by Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav and calculate 
the aggregate ETR.55 Instead of calculating the ETR for each individual company and then averaging 
those individual rates, an aggregate ETR sums together all companies’ income taxes during a certain 
time period and divides them by all companies’ pre-tax income during that same period. To smooth 
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out the business cycle, we can sum together the data in the numerator and the denominator over three, 
five, or even ten-year periods. 
 
But even the use of a long-term aggregate ETR is often not enough to smooth out the effects of major 
financial crises. Heavy losses were incurred during the dot com collapse and the global financial crisis, 
and these losses were particularly pronounced for smaller corporations, whose domestic pretax 
income turned sharply negative. Even when using ETRs aggregated across ten years, the inclusion of 
these crisis years still leads to a massive increase in the ETRs of smaller corporations. It would be easy 
for sceptics of concentration to dismiss the results of the disaggregate analysis, claiming they have 
been distorted by these crises. Erring on the side of caution, and ensuring consistency across the 
sample, we exclude data for years in which the annual profits for the top 10 percent or the bottom 90 
percent as a whole are negative.  
 
MAPPING JURISDICTIONAL TAX RATES 
 
With some of the main methodological issues outlined, we now turn to our main findings. Figure 3 
shows the worldwide ETR (federal, state, and foreign income taxes as a percentage of pretax domestic 
and foreign income) for US nonfinancial corporations in Compustat disaggregated by size. In the 
bottom part of the figure, we find bars with the ETRs. The dark grey bars plot the worldwide ETR 
for the top 10 percent in Compustat, and the light grey bars plot the worldwide ETR for the bottom 
90 percent. The line above the bars allows for an easier comparison of the worldwide ETRs of the 
top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent, expressing them as a ratio. The ratio can be interpreted as 
measures of the progressivity of the domestic and foreign tax structures.56 A ratio of one indicates a 
proportional tax regime (i.e. large corporations are subject to the same ETR as smaller corporations), 
a ratio above one indicates a progressive tax regime (i.e. large corporations are subject to a higher ETR 
than smaller corporations), a ratio below one indicates a regressive tax regime (i.e. large corporations 
are subject to a lower ETR than smaller corporations). 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
When viewed over the entire period, we see that the worldwide ETR for the top 10 percent declines 
from 37 percent in 1970-74 to 28 percent in 2015-18. The worldwide ETR of the bottom 90 percent 
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exhibits an inverted U-shape: From 34 percent in 1970-74, it climbs to a high of 62 percent in 1995-
99 before falling to 41 percent in 2015-18. What is most noteworthy in Figure 3 is the persistent 
regressivity in the corporate tax structure from 1980 onwards. During the 1970s, at the tail-end of the 
period of the tax state, the worldwide corporate tax structure was progressive, with large corporations 
facing higher ETRs than smaller ones. With the dawn of the debt state in the early 1980s, the tax 
structure turns proportional, with the worldwide ETR of large corporations equalling that of smaller 
corporations. From the mid-1980s the worldwide corporate tax structure turns regressive and has 
remained so for almost four decades. In the most recent period from 2015-18, the worldwide ETR of 
a large corporation was 13 percentage points lower than the worldwide ETR of a smaller corporation.    
 
What accounts for the persistently regressive worldwide ETR since the mid-1980s? Is the gap between 
the worldwide ETRs of large and smaller corporations the product of foreign tax structures? In what 
ways do domestic taxes, federal and state, contribute to this gap? One of the hallmarks of the latest 
phase of globalization is the geographical dispersion of corporate activity. As a result, we need to take 
into account all three tax structures in order to determine what is driving the worldwide ETRs of the 
top 10 percent and bottom 90 percent.  
 
Figure 4 presents our findings on jurisdictional ETRs. The graph in the top left-hand corner of the 
figure focuses on the domestic ETR, which measures federal and state income taxes as a percentage 
of pretax domestic income. As in Figure 3, the bars in the graph show the respective ETRs of the top 
10 percent and bottom 90 percent, and the line gages the overall progressivity of the tax structure. 
Here we see that the domestic ETR of the top decile increases slightly over the entire period, from 30 
percent in 1984-89 to 34 percent in 2010-18. The same thing can be said for the bottom 90 percent, 
as its domestic ETR increases from 43 percent in 1984-89 to 50 percent in 2010-18. What is most 
remarkable about the top left-hand graph is the pronounced gap in the domestic ETR of large and 
smaller corporations. The domestic tax structure is persistently regressive throughout the entire 
period, and in 2010-18 the domestic ETR of large corporations was a mere 0.68 times the size of the 
domestic ETR of smaller corporations. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
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The next two graphs in the figure break down the domestic ETR into its federal and state components. 
In the graph in the top right-hand corner, we find the federal ETR. Here we see that the federal ETR 
of the top 10 percent has increased from 25 percent in 1984-89 to 30 percent in 2010-18. Meanwhile 
the bottom 90 percent saw its federal ETR increase from 36 percent to 44 percent over the same 
period. The federal tax structure is persistently and highly regressive, with the ratio hovering between 
a high of 0.78 in the 1990s to a low of 0.70 in 2010-18. The graph in the bottom left-hand corner of 
Figure 4 shows the state ETR. As a percentage of domestic income, state taxes are obviously much 
smaller than federal taxes. But what we find is that the state tax structure is even more regressive than 
the federal one. Over the entire period the state ETR of the top 10 percent is considerably lower than 
that of the bottom 90 percent, and the state tax structure becomes increasingly regressive over time.  
 
In the the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 4 we find a graph with the foreign ETR. One thing that 
immediately stands out is the sharp decline in the foreign ETR of both the top 10 percent and the 
bottom 90 percent. For the top decile, the foreign ETR fell from 47 percent in 1984-89 to 25 percent 
in 2010-18. For the bottom 90 percent, the foreign ETR decreased from 40 percent to 29 percent over 
the same period. As for the progressivity of the foreign tax structure, we see that up until most recently 
the foreign ETR is progressive, with large corporations consistently facing higher foreign ETRs than 
smaller ones. But in the latest period, 2010-18, the foreign tax structure dips sharply into regressive 
territory, with the foreign ETR of the top decile only 0.90 times the size of the foreign ETR of smaller 
corporations.  
 
The dramatic fall in the foreign ETRs of both large and smaller corporations coheres with the widely-
accepted notion that tax competition has intensified with the increasing globalization that has come 
under the debt state. But our findings on the progressivity of the foreign tax structure may seem 
somewhat counterintuitive. It is common to assume that large multinational corporations enjoy a 
foreign tax advantage because their inordinate resources allow them to evade taxes and shift profits 
to low-tax jurisdictions.57 Our estimates suggest that large corporations do enjoy a foreign tax 
advantage relative to smaller corporations, but this is something that has occurred only in the past 
decade.   
 
Taken together, the mapping exercise in Figure 4 suggests that the regressive worldwide tax structure 
since the mid-1980s is due to the persistently regressive domestic tax structure, on the one hand, and 
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the recent turn to regressivity in the foreign tax structure, on the other. According to our findings, 
declining corporate tax progressivity is, as Streeck suggests, a key feature of the debt state as it has 
evolved over the past few decades. How do we make sense of the persistently regressive worldwide 
tax structure? What is the significance, if any, of the finding that large corporations consistently face 
lower ETRs than their smaller counterparts? Before we address these questions, we pivot in the next 
section to a discussion of recent debates about the consequences of corporate tax reform. Evaluating 
both sides of this debate puts us in a better position to address questions related to the wider 
implications of our findings, and eventually bring us back to the thorny question of power.   
 
DEBATING CORPORATE TAX REFORM  
 
In December of 2017 Donald Trump and the Republican party scored a major legislative victory as 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) was signed into law. The legislation introduced sweeping changes 
to the corporate tax code, replacing the global tax system with a territorial one, altering the system of 
deductions and credits, and imposing new charges on repatriated earnings. But the hallmark of the 
TCJA is undoubtedly the sharp reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate from 35 to 21 percent, 
which, as we saw earlier in our discussion of the transition from the tax state to the debt state, amounts 
to the biggest corporate tax cut in US history. 
 
As with most of Trump’s policies the TCJA has been controversial, sparking a rather heated debate 
about its anticipated impact.58 For supporters, the tax cut would play a significant role in reducing the 
cost of capital and thereby incentivizing companies to increase investment. As companies expand 
productive capacity in the wake of the tax cut, they will hire more employees and the increased demand 
for labour will in turn drive up wages. The most sanguine amongst TCJA supporters claim that the 
tax cut’s boost to economic activity will be so immense that it will end up increasing government 
revenues.  For critics, the tax cut is expected to have a negligible effect on investment. The more likely 
outcome is that corporations will simply replicate their response to George W. Bush’s tax cuts and use 
the windfall to increase dividend payments and share repurchases. Given that the top percentile direct 
or indirectly owns 40 percent of corporate shares, and the top decile 84 percent, those sceptical of 
TCJA argue that it is likely to fuel widening inequality.59 And rather than tax cuts paying for themselves, 
critical voices also maintain that the tax cut will lead to higher budget deficits and public indebtedness.  
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It is probably too early to come to any definitive assessment of the effects of TCJA, but preliminary 
studies are nevertheless beginning to surface. In the 2019 Economic Report of the President, Trump’s own 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) celebrate what it claims are the unequivocal successes of 
TCJA.60 The report emphasizes the results of business surveys, which show a slight post-TCJA 
increase in businesses reporting plans to increase capital expenditures in the next three to six months, 
as well as  an increase in executives agreeing with the statement that “now is a good time to expand.”61 
The report also notes a post-TCJA downturn in Morgan Stanley’s index of planned capital 
expenditures, but a considerable uptick in core capital goods orders.62 When it comes to direct 
evidence of actual business investment, the CEA report shows a surge in the “real” dollar amount of 
private nonresidential fixed investment by noncorporate businesses during the first three quarters of 
2018.  
 
There is, however, preliminary evidence that tempers the CEA’s optimistic view. As an alternative to 
the CEA’s focus on total dollar amounts, a report by Jane Gravelle and Donald Marples of the non-
partisan Congressional Research Service instead looks at rates of change in “real” private nonresidential 
fixed investment.63 Over all four quarters of 2018, Gravelle and Marples find that there has been a 
significant increase in investment. But what they also show is that since 2013 changes in investment 
have been quite volatile. Similar upswings in investment were evident in 2013-14 and 2017, making it 
difficult to attribute the 2018 increase specifically to the TCJA. Gravelle and Marples go on to note 
how in 2018 a record-breaking $1 trillion in stock buybacks was announced, an indicator of how most 
of the tax savings have been put to use.64  
 
By far the most rigorous study of the early impact of TCJA is from a group of economists at the 
IMF.65 Again, the authors of the IMF report observe that growth in private nonresidential investment  
in 2018 was higher than had been forecasted before the enactment of the TCJA. Yet according to 
their model, this had very little to do with the effects of the tax cut in lowering the cost of capital. 
Instead they attribute the investment surge largely to rising aggregate demand, which is a product of 
personal income tax cuts and government spending increases. Why, then, was the investment response 
to TCJA so muted? According to the IMF researchers, the limited investment response is largely due 
to the rising “market power” of large corporations. Their analysis shows the greater the market power 
of corporations (i.e. the higher their markup), the less likely it is that they will raise their investment in 
response to tax cuts.   
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The IMF report highlights one of the key dividing lines between supporters and critics of TCJA. Those 
in favour of tax cuts base their claims about its positive impacts on the assumption of a power-less 
economy characterized by perfect competition and frictionless markets.66 Animated by the equalizing 
forces of competition, all corporations, according to this view, are compelled to plough windfall 
profits from a tax cut back into productive capacity lest they lose ground to rivals. But critics point 
out that these competitive assumptions do not fit with empirical facts. In the real-world where market 
power prevails, critics claim that a large portion of corporate profits represent so-called “economic 
rents” – returns to monopoly power – rather than the “normal” returns to investment that occur 
under competitive conditions.67 Slashing taxes on monopoly profits, it follows, provides little incentive 
to invest.  
 
We think that these timely debates on corporate tax reform provide a foundation for exploring the 
consequences of our own findings, but with two crucial caveats. First, whereas our analysis focuses 
on ETRs, the debate about TCJA centres on the effects of changes to the statutory rate. For us, 
however, the difference is somewhat trivial. Both critics and supporters of TCJA would likely agree 
that cuts in the statutory rate matter only insofar as they affect what companies actually pay in effective 
terms.68 Second, even though the critics of TCJA acknowledge power, their usage of the concept 
differs substantially from our own. Critics juxtapose “normal profits,” which arise from the marginal 
productivity of capital in a perfectly competitive environment, to “economic rents,” which arise from 
“market power” (i.e. the capacity of firms to restrict competition, and increase barriers to entry, in 
ways that boost their bottom line and reduce overall welfare).69 But from the perspective of capital as 
power this dual framework is untenable. As revealed by the Cambridge Controversies a half-century 
ago, there is simply no way of determining the marginal productivity of capital.70 Without a measure 
of capital’s productivity, it follows that there is no way of determining what a normal profit level is, 
and, as a result, no way of ascertaining the level of monopoly rents above normal profits. In our view, 
power is a defining feature of capitalism, and the relevant empirical question is whether power is 
concentrated or widely dispersed. Rather than juxtapose monopoly power with an illusory scenario of 
perfect competition, we are interested in exploring power as it changes over time as measured by 
fluctuations in the degree of monopoly. This may seem like a trivial distinction, but in the next section 
we will see that it leads to a very different assessment of the consequences of changes to the corporate 
tax structure.  
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TAXES, POWER, AND THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE FIRM 
 
At this point, it is perhaps useful to re-state our main theoretical proposition. Earlier we surmised that 
a higher relative degree of monopoly for large corporations implied greater relative power and a lower 
relative ETR. Thus far our empirical mapping has indeed shown that large corporations have faced 
lower relative worldwide ETRs since the mid-1980s. What remains to be explored how changes in the 
relative ETR are intertwined with the relative power of the top decile of corporations, and how, it in 
turn, affects the distribution of power within the firm.  
 
In the upper left-hand graph of Figure 5 we present data on the degree of monopoly, our proxy for 
the concentration of power. The bars in the graph show the net profit margins of the top 10 percent 
and the bottom 90 percent, while the line above shows the ratio of their net profit margins. In the 
1970s, when the worldwide tax structure was progressive, we see that the net profit margins of large 
and smaller corporations were more or less equal. But as the worldwide tax structure turns regressive 
in the 1980s, the relative profit margins of large corporations start to increase. Since the 1990s, the 
degree of monopoly for large corporations has been consistently double that of smaller corporations. 
A sustained reduction in the relative tax burden of large corporations over the past few decades is 
bound up with a sustained increase in their relative power.  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
The next step in our analysis is to investigate the impact of the co-constitutive relationship of power 
and ETR on investment. To this end, we return to debates about corporate tax reform. Recall that for 
both supporters and critics, the primary indicator of the success of TCJA was whether or not it spurred 
investment. The reason investment was an indicator of success is because it would constitute evidence 
that the tax cut was creating widespread prosperity and not merely serving the narrow interests of 
shareholders. A tax cut-induced spurt of investment works in the interests of society at large insofar 
as expanding capacity should, in theory, provide the basis for increasing employment and higher 
wages. The powerless world of TCJA supporters envisions a positive relationship between tax cuts and 
investment. In the view of TCJA critics, a tax cut for large corporations with “market power” will 
have little to no impact on their overall investment. In the disaggregate view of capital as power, a 
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reduction in the relative tax burden of large corporations boosts their relative power and decreases their 
relative investment.  
 
The graph in the upper right-hand corner of Figure 5 shows the capital expenditures, one of the most 
common measures of investment, for large and smaller corporations as a percentage of their total 
revenues. Previously in Figure 3 we noted a decline in the worldwide ETR of the top decile, from 37 
percent in 1970-74 to 28 percent in 2015-18. As the bars in the upper right-hand graph in Figure 5 
indicate, the falling worldwide ETR of the top 10 percent has been accompanied by decreasing 
investment, with their capital expenditures falling from 9.2 percent of revenues in the 1970s to 6.7 
percent most recently. Meanwhile the capital expenditures of the bottom 90 percent, which has faced 
persistently higher ETRs over the past few decades, have been stable and in fact have increased in the 
most recent period. The relative measure of capital expenditures in the line above the bars of the graph 
presents an even more striking view of the relationship between tax and investment. In the 1970s, 
when the worldwide tax structure was progressive, the capital expenditures of large corporations were 
higher than those of smaller corporations. With the worldwide tax structure descending into persistent 
regressivity from the mid-1980s onwards, the relative capital expenditures of large corporations 
steadily decline. By 2010-18 the capital expenditures of large corporations as a percentage of revenues 
were 0.63 times the size of smaller corporations.  
 
We have seen that as power becomes more concentrated, large corporations face a lower relative ETR 
and simultaneously curtail their relative investment. Where does this leave the question of shareholder 
enrichment in our analysis? Critics of TCJA claim that large corporations with “market power” use 
their tax windfall not to invest but to boost dividend payments and share buybacks, thereby boosting 
the incomes of shareholders and top executives, the vast majority of whom fall within the top 10 
percent of the population.71 Taking a longer-term view, we find that things are a bit more complex. 
The graph in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 5 shows a metric of shareholder value, which is 
simply dividend payments and stock buybacks as a percentage of revenues.72 In the bars of the graph 
we see a steady increase in the dividend payments and share buybacks of the top decile since the 1970s. 
Yet what we also see is a corresponding rise in the dividend payments and share buybacks of the 
bottom 90 percent over the same period. As shown in the line above the bars, it is clear that, aside 
from a peak in the 1990s, large corporations have only been slightly more committed to shareholder 
value than their smaller counterparts. The secular rise in shareholder value orientation evidenced here 
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makes it difficult to directly link increasing dividends and share buybacks to the increasing regressivity 
of the worldwide tax structure. But this is not to say that shareholder enrichment is irrelevant or 
insignificant to our analysis. As a key aspect of the financialization of the firm, the rise of shareholder 
value can be viewed as a redistributive process that shifts power from workers to managers and 
shareholders.73 We can therefore assess the relationship between the tax structure and shareholder 
value not only in terms revenues dedicated to shareholder disbursement, but also in terms of the 
attendant shifts in firm-level power relations. To this end, we construct an index of shareholder power, 
expressed as a ratio of dividend payments and stock buybacks, a proxy for the interests of shareholders 
and managers, to capital expenditures, a proxy for the interests of ordinary workers.  
 
The graph in the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 5 presents our index of shareholder power for 
the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent. These indices of shareholder power offer a staggering 
picture of the transformations of power relations within large and smaller corporations over the past 
few decades. In the 1970s, when the worldwide tax structure was progressive and corporate 
concentration was relatively low, the ratio of shareholder power in large corporations was 0.28, slightly 
lower than the ratio of 0.30 in smaller corporations. But, with the regressive turn in the worldwide tax 
structure, the dynamic flips. In the 1980s, in the beginning phase of tax regressivity, the power of 
shareholders within large and smaller corporations equalizes at a higher ratio of 0.42. Since the 1990s, 
shareholder power within both large and smaller corporations has increased, but the upturn has been 
much more pronounced for the former than the latter.   
 
Though the contemporary rise of shareholder value is a common experience within the corporate 
universe, it has had an altogether different effect on power relations within large and smaller 
corporations. A sustained reduction in their relative tax burden has not compelled powerful 
corporations to plough their tax savings back into productive capacity. On the contrary, our research 
demonstrates that as big business becomes more disposed to short-term shareholder value 
enhancement that directly and disproportionately benefits the asset-rich, it becomes less disposed to 
advancing productivity, innovation and job-creation through long-term investment in the form of 
capital expenditures that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers. What this means is that the corporate 
tax structure is bound up not only with corporate concentration, but also widening inequality in the 
household sector. This dual rise of concentration and inequality is precisely what we expect under the 
debt state. Widening income inequality is usually attributed to declining progressivity in the individual 
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or personal income tax system.74 But our research suggests an important role for corporate taxation 
as well. For the past few decades, persistent regressivity in the worldwide tax structure has furnished 
big business with a distinct tax advantage, one that coincides with a bolstering of its relative power 
within the corporate universe and a reconfiguration of power relations within and beyond the firm. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our article has explored the contribution of corporate taxes to concentration, building an analysis 
with reference to two different sets of ideas. First, we contextualized our analysis historically through 
an engagement with the work of Wolfgang Streeck, which argues that advanced capitalist countries 
were transformed in the 1980s from tax states into debt states. In particular, we explored one facet of 
this broad shift: declining tax progressivity as it relates specifically to the corporate sector. We did this 
by developing the first map of the jurisdictional ETRs of corporations disaggregated by size. Our 
findings indicate that the worldwide ETR was progressive in the 1970s at the tail-end of the tax state, 
but has been marked by persistent regressivity since the rise of the debt state in the 1980s. Delving 
into jurisdictional measures of the ETR, we found that the regressive worldwide tax structure is a 
product of persistent regressivity of the domestic tax structure combined with the regressive turn in 
the foreign tax structure in recent years. Second, we examined some of the wider implications of our 
findings on jurisdictional ETRs by anchoring them within the capital as power approach. We 
empirically substantiated our main theoretical claims by demonstrating how persistent regressivity in 
the worldwide tax structure is bound up with the increasing relative power of large corporations within 
the corporate universe, and a shift of power within large corporations from workers to shareholders 
and managers.  
 
Overall, our findings suggest that issues of tax deserve much more attention within current debates in 
the US about corporate concentration than they have hitherto received. In making this claim, we are 
not trying to diminish the importance of other policies aimed at tackling rising concentration. If 
anything, the pervasiveness of concentration necessitates a multi-pronged strategy, one aimed not only 
at corporate taxation, but also antitrust and any other area of policy that has a substantive impact on 
distributive outcomes. Perhaps most importantly, our findings put paid to the notion that lower 
corporate taxes will “trickle down” to the benefit of everyone in society. On the contrary, in a system 
in which successive rounds of corporate tax reform translate into a persistently regressive corporate 
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tax structure, wealth and income become further concentrated at the top. It seems as if the public, in 
many ways, already has an intuitive grasp of these realities. Despite the concerted public relations 
efforts of the Republican Party and the right-wing think tanks that support it, TCJA, both before and 
after its implementation, has never been popular with voters.75 Channelling that intuitive discontent 
into support for restoring progressive taxation just might help to reverse some of the grave inequities 
of power that have built up under the debt state.  
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FIGURES 1-5 
 
Figure 1. The Logic of the Debt State 
Source: Hager (2016: 67) 
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Figure 2. The Contours of the US Debt State 
Source: 1880-2011 government spending data from Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2019). 2012-17 government 
spending data from Trading Economics (2019). 1902-2008 US tax revenue data from Piketty (2014), 2009-
2017 US tax revenue data and tax revenue data for all other G7 countries from OECD (2019a). Public debt 
data from IMF (2019). US corporate income tax receipts data from Office of Management and Budget (2019). 
Corporate income tax receipts data for all other countries from OECD (2019b). 1920-2011 statutory corporate 
tax rate data from University of Michigan World Tax Database (2019), 2012-2019 data from OECD (2019c) 
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Figure 3. Worldwide Effective Tax Rates: Top 10% versus Bottom 90% 
Source: Compustat through WRDS (2019) 
Note: The years 2000-02 and 2008 are omitted from the dataset  
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Figure 4. Jurisdictional Effective Tax Rates: Top 10% versus Bottom 90% 
Source: Compustat through WRDS (2019) 
Note: The years 2000-02 and 2008 are omitted from the dataset 
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Figure 5. The Degree of Monopoly and the Financialization of the Firm: Top 10% versus 
Bottom 90% 
Source: Compustat through WRDS (2019) 
Notes: The years 1999-2003 are omitted from the profit margins dataset 
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